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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The real and only issue of this case seems to be if an
appellant can cite eclesiastical non-legal authority with a cruel and
unusual punishment allegation and obtain and prevail on an appeal.
Sub-issues might exist if the legislative penalties for
public safety misdemeanors and ignoring court orders are rational.
The sufficiency of the evidence presented and the jury's prerogative
to believe a witness might also be an issue raised.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
vs.

:

Case No. 860027

l

HOWARD RODNEY MILLIGAN,

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Howard Rodney Milligan, was charged with the
offenses of driving without a license and failure to appear, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-2 and U.C.A. 41-6-168.
Defendant was tried in absentia in a bench trial in the
Justice Court, Third Precinct, Salt Lake County, Utah, the
Honorable Dan K. Armstrong, Justice of the Peace, presiding (R.
3).

He was found guilty as charged (R. 3).
Defendant appealed to the Third Judicial District Court

and was accorded a trial de novo on November 8, 1985, before the
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup.

Following a jury trial, defendant was

found guilty of both charges.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 8, 1985, Officer Geasper Bowman responded to
a call for assistance at the scene of a traffic accident on 4500

South and 1700 Westf within the boundaries of Utah Technical
College (R. 169-70).

Officer Bowman is a police officer for Utah

Technical College (R. 169).
The accident was caused by a small sedan which, when
making a right-hand turn, slid into defendant's van due to the
slick condition of the road (R. 170). Defendant's van was parked
at the light waiting to turn (R. 170). In the course of
investigating the accident. Officer Bowman asked the drivers of
both vehicles to produce their driver's licenses and
registrations (R. 171) . Defendant gave the officer his
registration, but stated that he did not have a driver's license
(R. 171) . After Officer Bowman ran a background check and
verified that defendant did not have a license, he issued a
citation to defendant for failure to have a driver's license (R.
172).

Defendant signed the citation (R. 172)• The officer read

to defendant the information on the citation stating that he had
"no less than 5 days nor more than 15 days" to appear as promised
(R. 173).
Officer Bowman then contacted the defendant's wife who
drove the vehicle away and he contacted the Driver's License
Department to make certain that defendant truly did not have a
license (R. 173). The department's records showed that defendant
must have had an old license which was expired (R. 173).
On March 18, 1985, a clerk at Utah Technical College
for Salt Lake County, contacted defendant who said that he did
not need to appear (R. 2). On March 19, 1985, a notice of
failure to appear was issued (R. 2 ) . On June 19, 1985, a plea of
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not guilty was issued on both counts by the court because
defendant refused to enter a plea (R. 3). Defendant signed the
notice of trial stating he knew the trial would be held in
absentia if he failed to appear (R. 3). The trial was held on
August 14, 1985 in absentia because defendant did not appear as
promised (R. 3). The court then found defendant guilty of both
counts (R.3).

The court sentenced defendant to 15 days in jail,

$150.00 fine, and $6.00 post assessment fee for no driver's
license and 5 days in jail, $50.00 fine and $4.00 post assessment
fee for failure to appear (R. 3). Both jail terms were to be
suspended on payment of fines (R. 3 ) .
On appeal, defendant requested a district court trial
de novo by jury. At the trial defendant represented himself pro
se.

Officer Bowman appeared as a witness for the prosecution.

A

four-person jury found defendant guilty on both counts. The
district court imposed the same sentence as the lower court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant's failure to provide this Court with any case
or statutory authority to support his appeal of error in
accordance with the rules of appellate procedure require summary
affirmance of his convictions and sentences.

Since the

regulation of motor vehicles on the highways is a proper subject
for state control, his arrest and conviction for driving without
a license was constitutionally valid.

The officer was authorized

to make the arrest, there was sufficient evidence to support a
jury finding of guilty, and the sentence imposed on defendant was
just.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE SHOULD
BE SUMMARILY AFFIRMED BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS
FAILED TO CITE ANY LAW OR FACTS REQUIRING A
REVERSAL.
In his brief on appeal, defendant fails to provide any
legal authorities or logical analysis to support his arguments.
He refers generally to the United States Constitution and the
Utah State Constitution but fails to link this claim to any
issue raised on appeal.

No statutory or case authorities are

cited for any issue other than cites to the Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure.

In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984), this

Court held that "[slince the defendant fails to support [her]
argument by any legal analysis or authority, we decline to rule
on it."

Defendants convictions and sentence should therefore be

summarily affirmed.
Defendant also fails to cite to the trial record or
transcript to support pertinent factual allegations upon which
he bases his legal arguments.

Under these circumstances, the

Court should assume the correctness of the jury's verdict and the
trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's convictions and
sentence.

Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure 24(a)(6) (1985).

State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 252, 253 (Utah 1983) (correctness of
trial court's judgment is assumed when counsel on appeal fails to
comply with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d) (1977)-the rule that preceded Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a) (6)
(1985); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah 1985) (failure to
cite to the record is grounds for affirming the decision of the
court below); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982).
-4-

In that Mtlhe burden of showing error is on the party
who seeks to upset the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263,
1267 (Utah 1982)r the State or this Court should not be put to
the task of developing defendant's legal arguments either by
supplying plausible legal analysis for those arguments, or by
searching through the record and making references thereto to
support defendant's factual allegations.

The obligation to

direct the Court to pertinent legal authority and to parts of the
record falls upon the defendant, and since defendant does not,
the appeal should be denied or the trial court summarily
affirmed.
POINT II
THE REGULATION OF THE HIGHWAYS AND MOTOR
VEHICLES IS A PROPER PUBLIC SAFETY SUBJECT FOR STATE CONTROL.
Defendant contends that, as a citizen of the United
States, he is entitled to a constitutional right of locomotion
(Brief of Appellant at p. 2 ) . It is well settled that the United
States Constitution protects an individual's right to travel on
public highways, as well as the public's right to highway safety.
See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170 (1978); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958).

See also Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416

P.2d 46, 48 (1966); Standish v. Dept. of Revenue, M.V.D., 683
P.2d 1276, 1281 (1984); and Crocker v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue,
652 P.2d 1067, 1072 (Colo. 1982).
It is also clear that the States have police powers to
promote public health and safety.

In Bastian v. King 661 P.2d

953, 956 (Utah 1983), the Supreme Court held:
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It is the power and responsibility of the
Legislature to enact laws to promote the
public health, safety, morals and general
welfare of society, icitation omitted]
and this Court will not substitute our
judgment for what of the Legislature with
respect to what best serves the public
interest.
The court also clearly stands for the logical proposition that
the "conditions for operation of a motor vehicle on public roads
is a proper subject for state regulation and control.11

State v.

Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985).
Defendant was convicted of offenses under the Motor
Vehicle Code, Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-2-2 and 4-5-168 (R. 128). The
respective violations for each section of the Utah Code were
driving without a license and failure to appear at court, both
motor vehicle class "B" misdemeanors.

The State's regulation of

each of these violations is a logical and legitimate exercise of
the State's broad police power.
As early as 1913, in Hendrick v. State of Maryland, 235
U.S. 610 (1913), the defendant challenged the State of Maryland's
power to regulate the public streets, the U.S. Supreme Court
held:
[A] State may rightfully prescribe
uniform regulations necessary for public
safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor
vehicles—those moving in interstate
commerce as well as others. And to this
end it may require the registration of
such vehicles and the licensing of their
drivers. . . . This is but an exercise
of the police power uniformly recognized
as belonging to States and essential to
the preservation of the health, safety
and comfort of their citizens; and it
does not constitute a direct and material
burden on interstate commerce. (Emphasis
added.)
-6-

235 U.S. at 632.
Since the Utah safety statutes constitute a legitimate
exercise of a S t a t e ' s police power, and the defendant's
allegations to the contrary are without merit, the conviction
should be l o g i c a l l y upheld.
POINT H I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
JURY'S GUILTY VERDICT.
Defendant argues that the evidence presented was
insufficient to convict him since the officer did not actually
see him drive and Officer Bowman was the only witness at trial.
At the trial, Officer Bowman testified that he knew
that defendant had been driving because another officer pointed
out the two drivers and defendant himself indicated that he was
the operator of the van (R. 40). Defendant cooperated with the
officer as the driver and never claimed not to be the driver.
The peace officer merely needs to have "grounds to believe that
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle."

Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 595

P.2d 1302, 1306 (Utah 1979).

Officer Bowman had probable cause

or reasonable grounds to believe that defendant was or had been
in actual physical control of the van at the time of the accident
based upon reason the "totality of the circumstances" test.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980).

See State v.
Officer Bowman could

reasonably determine from witness statements, his total combined
observations, the vehicle registration, admissions from the
defendant and his personal contact with defendant that defendant
had been driving.
-7-

Appellant may argue that Officer Bowman could not have
had reasonable grounds under the total facts and circumstances
test upon which to base his belief that defendant was the driver
because Bowman did not actually "see" him drive, however, as this
Court points out, "certain knowledge of guilt" is not required.
State v. Hatcher, 495 P.2d 159, (Utah 1972).

Reasonableness

under the total circumstances is still the test.
In State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1983) , the jury
believed appellant to be the driver of the vehicle that caused
the collision, although neither the witnesses nor the arresting
officer who arrived some time after the accident had actually
seen the appellant driving.

The Court held that there was

sufficient circumstantial evidence "from the witnesses, who
testified to having seen appellant crawl out of the vehicle, to
justify the officer's belief that appellant was the driver of the
vehicle."

Infrawsonand other cases, the arresting officer did

not see the appellant drive, however the courts have held the
grounds for belief to be reasonable even when based upon
citizens' statements and circumstantial evidence.

Certainly, the

jury in this case could find that Office Bowman could reasonably
believe that defendant was the driver, even if that belief was
based solely upon the uncontradicted statements of a fellow
officer made in the presence of the driver.

This vehicle was

also registered to the arrestee who was present and who provided
the officer with his vehicle registration and who did not deny
that he had been driving his own vehicle.
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Officer Bowman, as the witness for the prosecution,
presented his testimony based upon his personal knowledge and
observation at the accident scene.

Defendant had the opportunity

during the trial to testify, deny, cross-examine the officer and
to produce witnesses for his defense if he could.

Defendant

argues solely that more than one witness is necessary in order to
support a conviction.

But, the function of the jury is to

determine the truthfulness of the witness and the weight of the
evidence.

It is irrelevant how many witnesses testify as long as

the evidence presented is legally competent and admissible under
the Utah Rules of Evidence, and believed by the jury.
In addition to the peace officer's testimony, two
uncontested exhibits were entered into evidence.
certified copy of defendant's driving record.

Exhibit 1 was a

It was offered to

show that the date and time of the accident, a valid driver's
license in defendant's name was outstanding (R. 181).
Exhibit 2 was the original citation issued by Officer
Bowman which contained defendant's signature to the statement
"Without admitting guilt I promise to appear as directed herein."
(R 34 and 35). This was offered to show that defendant knew of
is duty to appear and of his promise to do so.

Also, the Court

took judicial notice of the court record which showed that
although the defendant was contacted by a clerk at Utah Technical
College, defendant refused to appear and a notice and information
concerning failure to appear was issued (R. 183).
The issues of whether the defendant was driving without
a valid driver's license and whether defendant failed to appear
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before the court were questions of fact for the jury*

He did not

deny that he was the driver and he admitted in court that he did
not appear (R. 202 and 203) . The testimony presented by the
officer and the admitted exhibits were sufficient to support and
uphold a verdict of guilty.
POINT IV
THE OFFICER WAS AUTHORIZED TO ARREST DEFENDANT.
Defendant argues that Officer Bowman did not have the
authority to arrest him because he was not a Category I officer
at the time of the arrest (Appellant's Brief, p. 5 ) . Defendant
believes that Officer Bowman was actually a Category II peace
officer at the time of arrest (Appellant's Brief, p.5) . This
argument of defendant is very confusing.
At the trial, Officer Bowman testified that he was a
certified Category One police officer [and at the time of the
arrest, employ.ed by the Utah Technical College.]

During

defendant's cross-examination of Bowman, the office explained
that he graduated from the academy in December of 1982 , and that
he returned to the Peace Officer's Academy in the summer of 1985
in order to comply with a recent change in the law requiring that
all peace officers fulfill the same requirements as state police
officers (R. 175). The change in the law did not affect Officer
Bowman's authority or competence at the time of the arrest.
Indeed, defendant has included in his brief copies of Officer
Bowman's certificates of completion, dated December 7, 19 82 and
July 17, 1985, both prior to the January 8, 1985 accident and
citation.
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The defendant does not challenge the arrest on the
basis of jurisdiction nor does he claim that a Category I officer
is not authorized to arrest or to issue citations. Therefore
obviously Officer Bowman was legally authorized to issue
defendant a citation for driving without a license.

POINT V
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON DEFENDANT WAS
LAWFUL AND REASONABLE.
Defendant claims that the sentence imposed on him by
Judge Armstrong and upheld by Judge Rigtrup constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment because the fine is higher than the guidelines
set for bail and because the sentence included some
incarceration.

Defendant seems to believe that the bail schedule

sets the mandatory fine and he believes that his fine was higher
than the bail limits solely because of his request for a jury.
Fines and imprisonment are limited by statute and are
not set by the bail schedule. Obviously a fine is not the same
as a security amount set for bail.

The former is a punishment

for violating the law and depends on the gravity of the
infractions, and the latter is only a guaranty that the person
charged will appear before the court for trial.
There is no evidence that the defendant was fined an
excessive amount because of his request for a jury.

In factf the

sentence was first imposed by Judge Armstrong in a non-jury
trial.

Then Judge Rigtrup uniformly imposed the exact same

sentence, despite the four-person jury implemented at defendant's
request at the trial de novo.

The record also shows that the

offenses for which defendant was convicted are Class B
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misdemeanors.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(2) states

that a person

convicted of a Class B misdemeanor can be imprisoned up to but
not exceeding six months.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-301(4) states

that a fine for a Class B misdemeanor is not to exceed $1,000.00.
This penalty is not disproportionate and generally not questioned
by this Court.

State v. Nance. 438 P.2d 542 (Utah 1968).

Since

defendant's sentence is much less than what is statutorily
allowed, "reasonable11 or "rational" for such offenses, it cannot
be termed an example of "cruel and unusual punishment."

State v.

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).
CONCLUSION
Defendant has failed to assert any authoritative
grounds for his assertions.

Since defendant was convicted by a

jury of his peers on the basis of legally competent evidence, and
reasonably sentenced, the respondent respectfully requests this
Court to summarily affirm the defendant's convictions and
sentences.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2nd day of September, 19S6.
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